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On November 15, 2011, Xun Wang, a former Managing Director of the Shanghai-based PPG
Paints  Trading  Co.  Ltd.  (fully-owned  subsidiary  of  the  American  PPG  Industries  based  in
Pennsylvania) pleaded guilty to the charges levelled against her before the federal judge at the
US District Court at Washington DC. Ms. Wang has been charged with conspiring to export and
re-export specially designed high-performance epoxy coatings to the Chashma-II Nuclear Power
Plant (CNUPP-II) in Pakistan without requisite export licenses.  [1] Ms. Wang - a Chinese citizen
and  a permanent US resident  -  has been  charged  with  one count  of  conspiracy and  three
counts of violating export laws under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
and the Export Administration Regulation (EAR).
Ms. Wang was arrested on June 16, 2011 at the Atlanta airport and made her first appearance
before the US District  Court  in  Washington  DC on  July  7,  2011.  While  pleading  guilty  on
November 15, Ms. Wang has reportedly reached a $200,000 settlement with the Department of
Commerce and  agreed  to cooperate with  investigators.  Ms.  Wang’s arrest  and  guilty plea is
intrinsically  linked  to  the  December  21,  2010  guilty  plea  made  by  PPG  Paints  Trading,
Shanghai, to one count of conspiracy and three counts of acting with knowledge of a violation
under  various  sections  of  the  EAR and  the  IEEPA.  PPG  Industries  Inc  which  is  based  in
Pennsylvania and  its fully owned Chinese subsidiary PPG Paints Trading  which  is based in
Shanghai, paid a total sum of US $ 3.75 million in criminal and administrative fines and over US
$ 32,000 in  restitution.  The  amount  of  these  fines  represents  one of  the  largest  penalties
imposed in the history of the Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce for
export violations.
Background
The current proceedings against Ms. Wang trace their origins to the January 2006 agreement
signed between the PPG Paints Trading and the Chinese government-owned company China
Nuclear  Engineering  Huaxing  Construction  Co.  Ltd.  to  supply  material  to  the  Chinese
companies working at the Chashma nuclear power plant in Pakistan. Huaxing Construction had
been sub-contracted by the Chinese government owned Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation
which is one of the Chinese companies involved in the construction of the Chashma Nuclear
Power Plant.
However, a licence from the US Department of  Commerce to export  the item was necessary.
This was due to two reasons. Firstly, epoxy paint and thinner was designated as EAR 99. This
meant that  it  was not on the US Department of  Commerce Control  List  but,  was subject  to
regulations. Secondly, the Chashma reactor - where the item was to be used - is owned and
operated  by  the  Pakistani  Atomic  Energy  Commission  (PAEC)  which  is  an  entity  on  the
Department of Commerce Entity list. Therefore, PPG Industries or any other organisation would
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require a licence from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to
export any material destined to be used at Chashma.
Following  the  inking  of  the  above  mentioned  agreement,  PPG  Industries  submitted  an
application to the US Department of Commerce for a license to export the epoxy paint coatings
to Chashma in  January 2006. Given  that  the PAEC was on  the Entity List,  the license was
denied by the BIS. Subsequently, PPG Paints Trading, Shanghai and Ms. Xun Wang (who had
joined PPG Paints Trading in May 2006) were informed of this development by PPG Industries.
It is interesting to note that prior to the January 2006 agreement with the PPG Industries, the
Huaxing Construction had unilaterally applied for an export license to export the epoxy paint to
Chashma on five separate occasions previously. Each time its application had been rejected.
The rejection of the PPG Industries application thus constituted its sixth attempt at procuring a
license – either directly or indirectly – to export the paint to be used at the Chashma nuclear
power plant.
Modus Operandi
Following the sixth rejection of the export license application, in June 2006, Xun Wang allegedly
conspired  with  the  Chinese  government-owned  Zhongyuan  Engineering  and  Huaxing
Construction to tranship the paint coatings to Pakistan via China.  Ms. Wang, PPG Industries
and the Chinese construction firms allegedly conspired to list Dalian Shi Zi Kou nuclear power
station as the end-user.  [2] Given that the US conducts civil nuclear trade with China, an export
license from the Department of Commerce would not be required if the epoxy paint was to be
used in  the Dalian  nuclear power plant  as opposed  to the case where the paint  was to be
exported to Chashma.  [3]
Therefore, by stating the end-user as the Dalian Nuclear Plant and not Chashma-II where the
paint  and  thinner  was  being  used,  PPG  Industries  between  June  2006  and  March  2007
exported a total of 385 gallons of epoxy paint and thinner in three separate shipments. The first
two shipments amounting to a total of 360 gallons (shipped between June 2006 and December
2006) successfully reached the Chashma reactor. However, the third shipment of 265 gallons
was stopped in January 2007 by PPG Industries while being stored at the PPG Paints Trading
warehouse at Shanghai for onward re-shipment to Chashma.
Conclusion
As the Department of Commerce investigations have brought out, apart from the conspiracy to
fudge the end-user, PPG Industries ignored several export control regulations and procedures
which begin with the very signing of the January 2006 contract with the Huaxing Engineering to
supply  epoxy  paint  and  thinner  to the  Chinese government-owned  Zhongyuan  Engineering
Corporation working at the Chashma nuclear plant. This agreement itself went against existing
US export control laws and regulations. Though it is not clearly established as to whether PPG
Industries was directly involved with its Chinese subsidiary PPG Paints Trading to supply the
regulated items to Chashma; some sort of tacit acceptance to turn a blind eye to the Chinese
subsidiary’s activities given that its future economic interests in China were at stake or at the
least, weakness of the company’s export control mechanisms is established beyond doubt.
There are several red flags which point to some level of complicity on the part of PPG Industries
in  tagging  along  with  the supply of  epoxy paints to Chashma via China.  Firstly,  when PPG
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Industries submitted an application in July 2006, to ship epoxy paint and thinner to the Dalian
nuclear power plant,  it  was fully aware that  the paint  and  thinner had not  received  requisite
clearances from the Chinese government  departments  and  thus  could  not  be used  in  any
nuclear power plant in China. Secondly, the company overlooked export control regulations and
procedures during the time of shipping of the product. PPG Industries instead of following the
laid-down procedure of directly shipping the consignment to the Dalian nuclear power plant -
which  was the  end  user  -  shipped  the consignment  to its  Chinese subsidiary  PPG  Paints
Trading. The third incident of oversight or turning a blind eye by PPG Industries - depending on
which end of the spectrum one is viewing the issue from - is regarding the timing of the order of
the epoxy paint  and  thinner  for  use at  the Dalian  nuclear  power plant.  It  is  fairly common
knowledge that as of June 2006, construction had just begun at the Dalian nuclear power plant.
Pouring of concrete was to begin more than a year later around September 2007. Given that the
epoxy paint and thinner have a shelf life of around a year, this should have prima facie been
enough to raise red flags at PPG Industries regarding the end use of the shipment, thereby
resulting in stopping of the shipment. However, nothing of that sort happened.
Though  the role of  the Chinese subsidiary,  PPG Paints  Trading  is  fairly  clear  and  straight
forward, the above indicates some degree of possible complicity on the part of PPG Industries to
ship the restricted items to Chashma via China. At the very least, PPG Industries did not follow
the rules and procedures laid down in the case of exporting such items. However,  the worst
case scenario points to possible complicity between the American  company and  its Chinese
subsidiary to honour an agreement with an important Chinese company - Huaxing - given its
connections with the Chinese government owned Zhongyuan Engineering. As brought out by a
PPG employee in June 2006, failing to follow through with the agreement with Huaxing would
make the chances of PPG Industries securing any future contracts in Chinese nuclear plants
fairly bleak. It is therefore very much in the realm of the possible that the entire conspiracy to
conceal the true end user of the consignment and tranship the products to Chashma via China
was  hatched  by  the American  company and  its  Chinese  subsidiary  due  to the  pressure -
whether direct or implied - to honour its commitment to supply the items to Chashma, the failure
of  which  would  hamper  the  company’s  prospects  to  do  business  in  the  lucrative  Chinese
nuclear construction market.
Coming close on the heels of the Chinese decision to build two nuclear power plants at Karachi
as well  as the continued assistance to the construction of nuclear reactors at Chashma, Xun
Wang’s case raises the worrying spectre of spotty Chinese implementation of and compliance
with international export control regulations. The case of such blatant violation of export control
laws also highlights the ever strengthening ‘all-weather’ friendship between China and Pakistan
which  continues to take new shape and  forms. The Xun Wang episode also raises a much
larger question; about the Chinese commitment to institutions and mechanisms like the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which it is a party
to.
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[4] Epoxy paint and thinner are categorised as ‘Level – I nuclear coatings’ and are tested and certified1.23
What are friends for? The supply of restricted items to Chashma via China http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ThesupplyofrestricteditemstoChashmav...
3 of 4 12/18/2012 11:05 PM
Source URL: http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ThesupplyofrestricteditemstoChashmaviaChina_avishwanathan_291111
Copyright © 2005 - 2012 IDSA. All rights reserved.
as such by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society for Testing and
Materials  (ASTM).  The Level I  Nuclear Coating  means that  they are able to  withstand the harsh
environment with respect to  the high temperatures and corrosion they have to  withstand inside the
containment area of a reactor, especially during loss of coolant during an accident like the one which
recently occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Japan.
[5] The ‘end-user’ is a critical aspect of export control regulations as it is used to determine the controls
that have to be placed on the exports. An end user can be broadly defined as the ‘final recipient’ of the
exported goods. The term ‘final recipient’ is very important especially in cases where the goods are
re-shipped from the consignee (first recipient).
[6]  A small fraction of  items which are to be exported from the US require a license from the BIS,
Department of Commerce. This is based upon the item’s technical characteristics, the destination, the
end-user, and the end-use. Every item which has to be exported and requires a license has a specific
Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) and is listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL). The
CCL is further subdivided into  ten broad categories (ranging from nuclear materials  to  propulsion
systems), and each category is further subdivided into five product groups (ranging from equipment,
software to  technology). Some low-technology goods which are not listed in the CCL, but are still
restricted, are designated as EAR 99. In many cases, EAR 99 items do not require a license to export.
However, in case the end user is of concern, or for a prohibited end-use or to an embargoed country,
a  license from the BIS  becomes  mandatory.  To  this  end,  the  Commerce Country  List  becomes
important. The Country List outlines several broad “reasons of concerns” (like national security, anti-
terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation etc.) based on which it  can be determined whether a license is
required for the export of a particular item to the country in question. For more details refer to Bureau
of  Industry and Standards, US Department of  Commerce, “Introduction to  Commerce Department
Export  Controls,”  August 2010,  available  at  http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/exportingbasics.htm [7],
accessed on November 23, 2011.
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